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Modelling and Administration of Contract-Based
Systems
Simon Miles and Nir Oren and Michael Luck and Sanjay Modgil and Nora Faci 1
Camden Holt and Gary Vickers2
Abstract. Mirroring the paper versions exchanged between busi-
nesses today, electronic contracts offer the possibility of dynamic,
automatic creation and enforcement of restrictions and compulsions
on agent behaviour that are designed to ensure business objectives
are met. However, where there are many contracts within a particular
application, it can be difficult to determine whether the system can
reliably fulfill them all; computer-parsable electronic contracts may
allow such verification to be automated. In this paper, we describe
a conceptual framework and architecture specification in which nor-
mative business contracts can be electronically represented, verified,
established, renewed, etc. In particular, we aim to allow systems con-
taining multiple contracts to be checked for conflicts and violations
of business objectives. We illustrate the framework and architecture
with an aerospace example.
1 Introduction
It has often been argued that agents interacting in a common sys-
tem, society or environment need to be suitably constrained in order
to avoid and solve conflicts, make agreements, reduce complexity,
and in general to achieve a desirable social order (e.g. [4, 5]). For
many, this role is fulfilled by norms, which represent what ought to
be done by a set of agents. Views of norms differ, and include fixed
laws that must never be violated as well as more flexible social guides
that merely seek to bias behaviour in different ways. Yet the obliga-
tions, prohibitions and permissions that may affect agent behaviour
in a normative system can also be documented and communicated
between agents in the form of contracts. Electronic contracts, mir-
roring the paper versions exchanged between businesses today, of-
fer the possibility of dynamic, automatic creation and enforcement
of such restrictions and compulsions on agent behaviour. However,
where there are many contracts within a particular application, it can
be difficult to determine whether the system can reliably fulfill them
all; computer-parsable electronic contracts may allow such verifica-
tion to be automated.
There are two pre-requisites to realistically applying an electronic
contracting approach in real-world domains. First, to exploit elec-
tronic contracts, a well-defined conceptual framework for contract-
based systems, to which the application entities can be mapped, is
needed. Second, to support the management of contracts through all
stages of the contract life-cycle, we need to specify the functionality
required of a contract management architecture that would underly
any such system, leading to ready-made implementations for partic-
ular deployments of that architecture.
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The CONTRACT project3 aims to do just this. Funded by the
European Commission as part of its 6th Framework Program, the
project seeks to develop frameworks, components and tools that
“make it possible to model, build, verify and monitor distributed
electronic business systems on the basis of dynamically generated,
cross-organisational contracts which underpin formal descriptions
of the expected behaviours of individual services and the system
as a whole.” In this context, this paper documents the CONTRACT
project’s work on both of the pre-requisites identified above. The
aims and vision of the project are described in full elsewhere [17].
More specifically, the technical contributions described in this paper
are: the specification of a model for describing contract-based sys-
tems; the specification of an architecture for managing such systems;
and the mapping of an aerospace application to those models.
Our approach takes a distinct approach in several respects. First,
its development is explicitly driven by a range of use cases provided
by a diverse set of small and large businesses. One consequence of
this diversity is that our approach must account for different practices
and possibilities in each stage of the lifecycle of a contract-based sys-
tem. It is therefore defined in terms of abstract process types, to be
instantiated in different ways for different circumstances. We pro-
vide a non-exhaustive set of options for instantiating these process
types, and technologies to support these processes. A more specific
requirement addressed by our approach is in managing not just ful-
filment or violation of contractual obligations, but also other states
of the system with regard to those obligations, such as being in dan-
ger of violation, being expected to easily fulfil an obligation, and
application-specific states.
In the next section, we provide an overview of the overall struc-
ture, introducing the conceptual framework and applying it to a run-
ning example. Then, in Section 3, we discuss how the contractual
obligations imply critical states of the system that we may wish to
detect and react to in order to effectively manage the system. In Sec-
tion 4, we describe the architecture: the process types that are re-
quired to manage contract-based systems and components that can
support such processes. We disuss related work in Section 5 and con-
clude with future work in Section 6.
2 CONTRACT Framework and Architecture
The models and procedures comprising the CONTRACT framework
and architecture are shown in Figure 1. The primary component of
this is the framework itself, depicted at the top of the figure, which
is the conceptual structure used to describe a contract-based system,
including the contracts and the agents to which they apply.
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Figure 1. The overall structure of the CONTRACT architecture and
framework
From the framework specification of a given application, other im-
portant information is derived. First, understanding the contractual
obligations of agents allows us to specify the critical states that an
application may reach. A critical state of a contract-based system
with regard to an obligation essentially indicates whether the obli-
gation is fulfilled or fulfillable, e.g. achieved, failed, in danger, etc.
This is discussed in detail in Section 3. A state-based description,
along with the deontic and epistemic implications of the specified
contracts, can then be used to verify a system either off-line or at
run-time [11] (though we do not discuss this further here).
The framework specification is used to determine suitable pro-
cesses for adminstration of the electronic contracts through their life-
times, including establishment, updating, termination, renewal, and
so on. Such processes may also include observation of the system, so
that contractual obligations can be enforced or otherwise effectively
managed, and these processes depend on the critical states identified
above. Once suitable administration processes are identified, we can
also specify the roles that agents play within them, the components
that should be part of agents to allow them to manage their contracts,
and the contract documents themselves. Such process types and roles
are described in Section 4.
2.1 A Contract-Based System Framework
We first specify a conceptual framework by which contract-based
systems can be described. This framework provides a clear indication
of how particular applications can exploit contracts and how they
must be supported in managing them. By being abstract and generic,
such a framework may also be used to translate contract data from
one concrete format to another.
Contracts document obligations, permissions and prohibitions
(collectively clauses) on agents and are agreed by those agents. Sim-
ply, obligations are statements that agents should do something and
prohibitions are statement that they should not. Since agents are au-
tonomous, external control can only be specified through normative
structures such as contracts. Thus, permissions are defined as excep-
tions to prohibitions: if something was not prohibited, it is not mean-
ingful for a permission to be granted.
The agents obliged, permitted and prohibited in a contract are par-
ties to that contract, which specifies contract roles, played by agents
within it. Each clause in a contract applies to roles, to which agents
are assigned, and each agent can hold multiple contracts with the
same or different parties. Finally, a contract proposal is one that has
not yet been agreed. These concepts are summarised in Table 1.
Concept Definition
Role A named part that can be played by an agent in a system.
Obligation A statement that an agent playing a given role should do some-
thing.
Prohibition A statement that an agent playing a given role should not do
something.
Permission An exception to a prohibition for an agent playing a given role
under given circumstances.
Clause An obligation, prohibition or permission.
Assignment A statement that an agent should play a given role.
Proposal A document containing a set of clauses and assignments,
where every role referred to which each clause applies has been
assigned to an agent.
Contract A proposal to which all assigned agents have agreed.
Table 1. The primary concepts in the CONTRACT framework
2.2 Aerospace Use Case
To test and illustrate the efficacy of our approach, we adopt an en-
gineering application, based on the aerospace aftercare market, tar-
geted by Lost Wax’s agent-based Aerogility platform [1], and used
as a running example through the paper.
The application concerns the continued maintenance of aircraft en-
gines over their lifetime. In this domain, an engine manufacturer is
contractually obliged to ensure operators’ aircraft have working en-
gines. For an engine to be working, it should not be overdue for reg-
ular servicing or left waiting to be fixed after a fault is discovered.
An aircraft’s engine can be replaced when it lands at some location
if there is a suitable spare engine present at that location. As well
as replacing engines to ensure continued operation of the aircraft, an
engine manufacturer will service the engines it has removed, so that
the serviced engine can be added back into circulation (the “engine
pool”) and used to replace other engines.
In addition to long-term contracts between engine manufacturers
and operators, we consider short-term contracts regarding particular
instances of servicing engines. These sit in the context of long-term
contracts but, by being specified explicitly, allow the parties to use
and commit to resources more flexibly. In a long-term contract be-
tween an aircraft operator and an engine manufacturer, the manufac-
turer agrees to service the operator’s aircraft to some overall spec-
ified standard over the duration of the contract. Such a contract is
provided in Table 2, using the framework concepts. Here, the oper-
ator specifies a preferred time within which the manufacturer must
service an aircraft, and the manufacturer is obliged to meet this in
90% of cases. If the manufacturer does not meet short-term contract
requirements (see below), penalties are deducted from the long-term
payment the operator is obliged to make. The operator is obliged to
provide adequate engine data so that the manufacturer can fulfil their
servicing obligations. Finally, the operator may have demands on the
provenance of an engine: operator A may be happy to re-use engines
previously used by operators B or C but not those used by D.
In this context, a short-term contract concerns the servicing of a
particular aircraft at a particular time (see Table 3). It is again be-
tween two parties: the aircraft operator and the engine manufacturer.
Roles Manufacturer, Operator
Obligations O1 Manufacturer agrees to servicing contracts requested by
operator during aftercare contract period.
O2 Manufacturer services engines within the preferred time
specified by the servicing contracts in at least 90% of cases.
O3 Operator pays for servicing of engines, minus any penal-
ties.
O4 Operator must supply engine health data to the manufac-
turer in an adequate time to allow problems requiring unsched-
uled maintenance to be detected.
Prohibitions P1 Manufacturer is prohibited from supplying engine parts
previously used by other operators not on an approved list (if
one is given) or on a disapproved list (if one is given).
Permissions R1 Manufacturer is allowed to supply engine parts previously
used by other operators on an approved list (if one is given).
Table 2. Long-term aftercare contract
In this case, the manufacturer has more specific obligations: that they
must either service an aircraft in the preferred timescale or pay a
penalty, and that they must service it within a maximum period. The
limitations on provenance apply in the particular short-term servicing
as they do in the long-term aftercare.
Roles Manufacturer, Operator
Obligations O5 Manufacturer services aircraft in preferred time, or pays
penalty (taken out of aftercare contract payment from opera-
tor).
O6 Manufacturer services engine in maximum time.
Prohibitions P2 Manufacturer is prohibited from supplying engine parts
previously used by other operators not on an approved list (if
one is given) or on a disapproved list (if one is given).
Permissions R2 Manufacturer is allowed to supply engine parts previously
used by other operators on an approved list (if one is given).
R3 Operator is allowed to take a penalty from the manufacturer
if an aircraft is left on the ground for longer than the preferred
time agreed.
Table 3. Short-term servicing contract
Such formal documents of agreements are important, especially
when there are multiple agreements and when these agreements can
interact, because they can reveal critical points of potential or actual
conflict. If it is possible to examine such contracts, and determine
where these critical points lie, so that they may be monitored for vio-
lations, or even modified to avoid the potential for violation. In what
follows, these aims inform the elaboration of our architecture. For
example, a short-term conflict between two servicing contracts in the
aerospace domain occurs when a manufacturer is obliged to service
two operators’ aircraft at the same time, but can only service one due
to a lack of resources. Long-term conflicts are also present, as in a
conflict between a servicing contract and an aftercare contract arising
when a manufacturer must choose between servicing one operator’s
aircraft within the maximum time limit and servicing another opera-
tor’s aircraft within the preferred time, where the manufacturer is in
danger of not having serviced the latter operator’s aircraft within the
preferred time limit for 90% of cases.
3 Critical States of Contract-Based Systems
By identifying the critical states of the system with respect to given
contractual obligations, indicating whether the obligation is fulfilled
or fulfillable, it is then easier to determine which of these needs to be
checked for and acted upon to ensure that the system performs well.
A state-based description can also be used as a basis for verifying
whether the system will always result in a desirable state.
3.1 Obligation States
Each obligation implies a set of states for the system with regard to
that obligation. In part, these can be specified independently of the
application. For example, we classify obligations into three types:
• An obligation to achieve some state G, e.g. to pay some amount
to another agent.
• An obligation to maintain some state H , e.g. to keep an aircraft in
working order.
• An obligation to behave in some way, where that behaviour is to
fulfil obligation O(X) whenever event E(X) occurs, e.g. when
aircraft X requires servicing, to service X in an acceptable time.
For an achievement obligation, there are three significant states:
Pre-achievement, Succeeded and Failed. Each of these has particu-
lar properties with regard to the goal state G, as shown in Table 4
(top). In Pre-achievement, the goal state is achievable but not yet
achieved; in Succeeded, the system is in the goal state; and in Failed,
the goal state is no longer achievable. Similarly, a maintenance obli-
gation implies three significant states, as shown in Table 5 (top). In
the Maintained state, the system is in the goal state; in Succeeded,
the system can no longer leave the goal state; in Failed, the system
has left the goal state. Finally, the significant states of a behaviour
obligation depend on the obligation, O, triggered in reaction to each
event, but it has some states of its own as shown in the top of Table 6.
In the Pre-trigger state, the triggering event has not yet occurred; in
the Reaction Active state, an event has occurred but the obligation it
has triggered into taking force has not yet reached a Succeeded or
Failed state; in Reaction Failed, that reaction obligation has reached
a Failed state, and so the behaviour obligation as a whole has failed;
in Reaction Succeeded state, the particular reaction obligation has
succeeded; and in Succeeded, no more applicable events can ever oc-
cur and so the behaviour obligation as a whole has succeeded. All
obligations also imply a state, Cancelled, when the obligation no
longer holds.
State Properties
Pre-achievement Not G
G achievable
Agent obliged to achieve G
Succeeded G
Failed G unachievable
Agent obliged to achieve G
Cancelled No agent obliged to achieve G
Sub-State Additional Properties
Initial
Danger G in danger of becoming unachievable
Likely Success G’ achieved, where G’ is a significant subset of G
Table 4. Basic states (top) and sample pre-achievement sub-states
(bottom) of an achievement obligation
3.2 Significant Sub-States
In addition to the application-independent system states above, ap-
plications often refer to significant sub-states part-way between an
obligation coming into force and its success or failure. Examples of
these are shown in the bottom portion of Tables 4, 5 and 6. For ex-
ample, an application may need to detect whether an obligation is
in danger of violation and so allocate more resources to ensure that
it is fulfilled instead, implying a Danger critical state of the system
with regard to that obligation as shown in Table 4 (bottom). On the
other hand, if an obligation is being fulfilled unexpectedly easily, an
State Properties
Maintained H
Not H achievable
Agent obliged to maintain H
Succeeded Not H unachievable
Failed Not H
Agent obliged to maintain H
Cancelled No agent obliged to maintain H
Sub-State Additional Properties
Initial
Danger Not H in danger of becoming true
Table 5. Basic states (top) and sample maintained sub-states (bottom) of a
maintenance obligation
application may take advantage of this by transferring resources be-
ing used in support of this obligation to other tasks, e.g. the Likely
Complete critical state shown in Table 6.
State Properties
Pre-trigger No new E(X) has occurred
Agent obliged to achieve G(X), maintain G(X) or behave in
way B(X) on every E(X)
Reaction
Active
E(a) occurred
As Pre-achievement, Maintenance or Pre-trigger state for
G(a)/B(a)
Agent obliged to achieve G(X), maintain G(X) or behave in
way B(X) on every E(X)
Reaction
Failed
E(a) occurred
As respective Failure state for reaction G(a) or B(a)
Agent obliged to achieve G(X), maintain G(X) or behave in
way B(X) on every E(X)
Reaction
Succeeded
E(a) occurred
As respective Succeeded state for reaction G(a) or B(a)
Agent obliged to achieve G(X), maintain G(X) or behave in
way B(X) on every E(X)
Succeeded E(X) can never occur again
Cancelled No agent obliged to achieve G(X), maintain G(X) or behave in
way B(X) on every E(X)
Sub-State Additional Properties
Initial
Imminent E(X) is likely to occur imminently
Likely
Complete
E(X) is unlikely to occur again
Table 6. Basic states (top) and sample pre-trigger sub-states (bottom) of a
behaviour obligation
3.3 Example
As an example, in Table 7, we enumerate critical states for an
achievement obligation, indexed O2, in the long-term aftercare con-
tract of Table 2. It is an achievement obligation as it describes an
eventual state of the system in which a state has been achieved, i.e.
90% of servicing cases were performed in the preferred time period.
When the contract first comes into force, i.e. the system time is within
the contract period, the state Pre-achievement: Initial holds. In this
state, insufficient cases have been performed to determine whether
success is likely. After 5% of cases are performed, the system will be
in either Pre-achievement: Satisfactory or Pre-achievement: Danger
states, and may vary between them over the contract period. Pre-
achievement: Satisfactory holds where over 5% of cases are per-
formed within the preferred time, while Pre-achievement: Danger
holds where between 5% and 10% of cases exceeded that time. The
value of taking account of these two states is that transfer of re-
sources between fulfilment of different obligations can be triggered
by changes of state. Eventually, the system will reach either Suc-
ceeded state, where the contract period is exceeded and over 90% of
cases were performed on time, or Failure state, where over 10% have
exceeded the preferred time. The choice of the appropriate sub-states
(Pre-achievement: Satisfactory and Pre-achievement: Danger in this
case) is entirely application dependent: considering more states al-
lows finer control as appropriate, but may also add overheads.
Pre-
achievement:
Initial
Less than (estimated) 5% of servicing cases performed and
within contract period
Pre-
achievement:
Satisfac-
tory
Over 5% of cases performed, less than 5% exceeded preferred
time and within contract period
Pre-
achievement:
Danger
Between 5% and 10% of cases exceeded preferred time and
within contract period
Succeeded Less than 10% of cases exceeded preferred time and beyond
contract period
Failed More than 10% of cases exceeded preferred time
Table 7. States of aftercare contract obligation O2
4 Architecture of Contract-Based Systems
Aside from modelling contract-based systems using the CONTRACT
framework, we also address the issue of administration: how to man-
age the processes involved in creating, maintaining, acting on and
otherwise processing contracts and contract proposals. We identify
four key process types in the contract life-cycle.
Establishment brings about the existence of the contract.
Maintenance and Update ensures a contract’s integrity over time.
Fulfilment brings about the fulfilment of obligations while observ-
ing its prohibitions.
Termination or Renewal end the normative force of the contract,
or renew it to apply for a longer period.
Each of these process types can be instantiated in different ways,
depending on the application and its deployment. The choice dictates
the roles agents must play to fulfil the administration duties implied.
Below, we examine each process type in turn.
4.1 Establishment
There are many potential ways to establish a contract, varying in
complexity. To give an illustration, we present two below.
Full Proposal Establishment Process Here, one party, the pro-
poser, creates a full proposal, excluding some assignments of roles
to agents, and signs it. It then uses a registry to discover agents that
may fulfil the unassigned contract roles. For each unassigned role in
turn, it offers the proposal to an agent, a potential party it is satisfied
can assume that role. If the party is willing, it signs the proposal and
returns it. When the last role is filled, a contract is established
Template Discovery Establishment Process Alternatively, a pro-
cess may be used in which an agent discovers a contract template
that may be instantiated in a way that fulfils its goals. This implies
the use of a template repository, where templates can be stored. Such
templates may have some assigned roles; that is, they may describe
services for which a provider is willing to negotiate terms.
4.2 Maintenance and Update
The continued existence and integrity of a contract after establish-
ment is important in reliable systems. As with establishment, there
are multiple ways in which this can be achieved, and the functional-
ity that needs to be provided depends on the particular contract and
application.
Contract Store Maintenance Process Here, contract parties use a
contract store to maintain and control access to contracts. The store
is obliged only to allow agents to change the contract when all parties
send a signed agreement of the change to be made.
All Party Signature Maintenance Process In this process, integrity
is preserved by the contract being signed by all parties in a way that
prevents editing without detection; for example, digital signatures
based on reliable certificates. The signed document includes the con-
tract itself, and an indication of whether it is a revision of a previous
version. Each party should check the signatures of the contract before
accepting it as binding.
4.3 Fulfilment
For every contractual obligation and prohibition, there are certain
processes that can be performed to help ensure they are fulfilled.
As with the processes above, these imply particular administrative
roles that must be played by agents. The administrative roles carry
with them obligations, prohibitions and permissions, which may be
documented in the same contract as the one that is the target of ad-
ministration, or another contract. The processes below often refer to
particular system states with regard to obligations: these are the states
specified in Section 3.
Observation of Fulfilment Process An observer observes state
changes to determine whether contractual obligations are being ful-
filled. It can notify other agents when an obligation is being violated
or in danger of violation4. An observer X is in an obligation pattern
of the following form:
X is obliged to observe for critical state S of contract clause
C, and notify registered listeners when it occurs.
Management of Fulfilment Process A manager is an agent that
acts when an obligation is not being fulfilled, is in danger of not
being fulfilled or a prohibition is breached. It knows about the prob-
lem by (conceptually at least) registering to listen to the notifications
from an observer. Manager is a role, and one agent may play the role
of both manager and observer. The nature of the action taken by a
manager may vary considerably. In highly automated and strict ap-
plications, an automatic penalty may be applied to a party. In other
cases, a management agent may be a human who decides how to
resolve the problem. Alternatively, a manager may merely provide
analysis of problems over the long term, so that a report can be pre-
sented detailing which obligations were violated. A manager X is in
an obligation pattern of the following form:
X is obliged, whenever the system reaches a critical state S of
contract clause C, to perform action A.
Note that we avoid the sometimes used term, enforcer, because en-
forcement implies action either in the case of failure or in the case of
likely failure, and often sanctions or financial penalties. In the appli-
cations we are considering, likely success is also a good state to act
upon, e.g. to reallocate resources used for the successful obligation,
4 Note that we do not use another term sometimes appearing in the literature,
monitor, because it is also often used to refer to quantitative infrastructure-
level measurements of system metrics: in the case of many business appli-
cations, observation is of discrete high-level states.
and actions may take softer forms, e.g. notified humans renegotiate
the contract, so the more generic term, manager, is used.
An example of an observer’s obligation in the aerospace appli-
cation is shown in Table 8 (top), and of a manager’s obligation in
Table 8 (bottom). The observer, Checker, is obliged to check that a
Danger state has not been reached for the number of suitable engines
available at a given location, and the manager, Enforcer, listens to
observations on this state and rectifies the situation when it occurs.
Roles Checker, Manufacturer, Operator
Obligations Checker monitors the number of engines available to the man-
ufacturer at a given location that are suitable for a given oper-
ator, and notifies registered agents if it falls below a minimum
quantity.
Roles Enforcer, Checker
Obligations Enforcer, on hearing from checker that the number of suitable
engines at a location has fallen below a minimum level, trans-
ports a suitable engine from another location.
Table 8. Engine supply checking contract (top) and Engine supply
enforcement contract (bottom)
4.4 Termination and Renewal
Termination of a contract means that the obligations and other
clauses contained within it no longer have any force. A contract may
be terminated in several ways: (i) it may terminate naturally if the
system reaches a state in which none of its clauses apply, e.g. a con-
tract’s period of life expires or all obligations have been met; (ii) it
may terminate by design if the contract has an explicit statement that
the contract is terminated when a particular event occurs (e.g. if one
party fails to meet an obligation, the contract is terminated and all
others are released from their obligations); or (iii) it may terminate
by agreement, if parties agree that the contract should no longer hold,
and update it accordingly (in line with the process chosen for the
Maintenance and Update type above). Renewal of a contract means
that a contract that would have imminently terminated naturally is
updated so that termination is no longer imminent (again depending
on the Maintenance and Update process type above).
4.5 Administrative Roles and Components
The processes above all require the fulfilment of particular adminis-
trative roles, e.g. contract store, registry, observer, manager. For some
of these components, we can provide generic implementations. For
example, a contract store, based solely on contract documents and
having nothing to do with the application itself, is easy to imple-
ment generically. Others, such as managers, need to have application-
specific instantiations, as dealing with a contractual obligation not
being fulfilled varies greatly between applications. Specifying the
components further is largely a technology-dependent issue out of
scope of this paper.
5 Related Work
There has been much previous work on various aspects of contract-
based system modelling, enactment and administration, and our ap-
proach is intended to build on and be compatible with other ideas
presented elsewhere. For example, there are many approaches to ne-
gotiation which may be used in the establishment of contracts [12],
and the administration of contracts can integrate with other useful be-
haviour, such as observation of fulfilment and violation of obligations
potentially feeding into a longer-term assessment of agents [7]. Work
on multi-party contracts [18] adopt modelling techniques specifically
designed to enable detection of parties responsible for contract viola-
tion, but do not use normative concepts to regulate agent behaviour,
or model other contract administration processes.
In addition, the wider domains of normative systems and agree-
ment in service-oriented architectures informs our work. Concepts
such as norms specifying patterns of behaviour for agents, contract
clauses as concrete representations of dynamic norms, management
or enforcement of norms itself being a norm, are all already estab-
lished in the literature [6, 7, 14, 8].
However, the approach in this paper is distinct in that it is con-
cerned with the development of practical system deployments for
business scenarios. In particular, business systems operate in the con-
text of wider organisational and inter-organisational processes, so
that commitments, providing assurance over the actions of others as-
sumes great importance. While potentially less flexible over the short
term, explicit contracts provide just such commitments and are there-
fore more appropriate for business systems than more flexible, less
predictable ad hoc approaches [9, 16].
We also believe our system to be more widely applicable than
some other approaches. By classifying processes into types with dif-
ferent instantiations, the architecture can be incorporated into a wider
range of application domains and deployments than fixed protocols
would allow. In addition, we describe how administrative functions,
such as storing or updating a contract, can be achieved. This con-
trasts with specifications such as WS-Agreement and Web Services
Service Level Agreement, where the specifications cover only part of
the necessary administration [2, 15]. Abstract architectures for elec-
tronic contracting, and associated case studies, have been described
elsewhere; most notably in the work of Grefen et.al [10, 3]. How-
ever, accommodation of deontic specifications in order to regulate
agent behaviour is not modelled in this work. Our approach aims for
broad observation and management of obligations and prohibitions,
so as to verify whether they are being achieved, prevent failure when
in danger of violation and take advantage of success when obliga-
tions are being easily met. Some existing work does consider system
states with regard to contract clauses [13], but none, to our knowl-
edge, classifies obligations and the critical states they imply as we
have done in this paper, a necessary pre-requisite to observing and
managing obligation fulfilment in accordance with a particular ap-
plication.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented the CONTRACT conceptual frame-
work and architecture, and shown how they apply to aircraft af-
tercare. By creating a technology-dependent implementation along
these lines, an application can take advantage of the reliable coordi-
nation provided by electronic contracts. The CONTRACT project aims
to allow multi-agent systems to be verified on the basis of their con-
tracts, building on work by Lomuscio et al. on deontic interpreted
systems [11]. While this verification is beyond the scope of this pa-
per, it places a requirement on our framework that the properties of
the target system are identified and isolatable, and a requirement on
the architecture that such information can be captured in order to
pass to a verification mechanism. Perhaps equally importantly, we
also aim for an open source implementation built on Web Services
technologies, requiring the architecture to be compatible with such
an objective. Finally, taking a very practical standpoint, we intend to
construct a methodology to guide development of applications that
use electronic contracts through the process from conceptual frame-
work to deployment.
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